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Abstract 
The United Nations (UN) is the guardian of international human rights standards. To help 
protect and promote these standards, the UN developed peacekeeping operations in post-
conflict environments. Recently there have been highly publicised reports of gender-based 
sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers during deployment. These cases 
have revealed systematic failures with the UN and troop contributing countries’ (TCC) 
management and prosecution of these cases, and the violation of victims’ human rights. 
Immunity is an important aspect of UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers are 
deployed in areas which are politically unstable, and ‘where normal institutions of law and 
order are not functioning.’2 The UN extended immunity from host state prosecution to 
peacekeepers ‘to protect’ UN personnel from ‘harassment’ during missions, and to protect 
itself from suit for institutional negligence. International legal experts argue that immunity, 
and a subsequent ‘culture of impunity’, has resulted in TCC failing to exercise authority in 
cases of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by deployed peacekeepers. 
 
This article addresses the current responses of the UN and TCC to allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers during missions. It will examine the 
extent to which conflict between immunity protections and institutional accountability reflect a 
larger conflict between the international ‘human rights and peace and security functions of 
UN governance operations.’3 It will also attempt to reconcile legal and non-legal mechanisms 
introduced by the UN to deal with impunity, with current and emerging law on immunity and 
human rights, to identify a possible solution to these problems.4 
 
Keywords: international human rights; peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations; sexual 
exploitation; sexual abuse; immunity, gender justice 
 
Introduction 
Since the creation of the UN, it has been involved in establishing international human rights 
standards, with a focus on ‘preventing and stopping conflicts.’5 Peacekeeping operations 
were introduced to help realise these objectives and preserve international peace and 
security. They were designed ‘to create space for mediators’ to identify ‘a political solution 
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[and] address the underlying causes’ of conflict, in the interests of preserving those human 
rights globally.6 Traditional UN peacekeeping missions were limited in their scope and 
strategic planning.7 Consequently, immunity granted to UN peacekeeping personnel was not 
envisioned to be problematic. This article will investigate the development of UN 
peacekeeping missions and explore how they have evolved in order to contextualise the 
impact of impunity on the human rights of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. 
 
The UN Charter’s preamble asks Member States to ‘save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war’.8 In support of this, the UN adopted an intervention strategy. This involved 
the deployment of soldiers from TCC by the UN to post-conflict environments, to ‘help 
maintain or restore peace and security’ in the affected territories.9 The aim was ‘to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights’ in such conflict situations, and to establish an 
environment where ‘justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained’ in post-conflict landscapes. This would serve 
to ‘promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’ in such afflicted 
territories.10 The two main functions of the UN thus became inextricably linked: ‘Maintaining 
peace and security and respecting human rights.’11 The goal of peacekeeping missions 
‘should be to measurably increase respect for human rights law.’12 In the context of UN 
peacekeeping, the protection of civilians in post-conflict environments, and the ability of 
victims of war crimes to seek justice, is a core aspect of human rights. Peacekeepers have 
been allocated the responsibility for enabling this justice process to happen. However, 
questions are being raised regarding the conduct of peacekeepers during operations, 
particularly in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse, and the human rights of women and 
girls. This brings a gender dimension which was not originally considered when the concept 
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of peacekeeping operations emerged within the UN. While a more gender-aware perspective 
is now part of UN thinking, the issue remains whether it has done enough to address the 
wider international human rights abuses committed by deployed peacekeepers. Despite the 
introduction of Conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)13 and UNSCR 1325,14 the UN continues to be 
perceived as being negatively gendered. Focussing on the sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by UN peacekeepers during operations this article examines how far the 
objectives of achieving a gender-balance in the justice process has emerged post-CEDAW 
and UNSCR 1325, and explores impunity as a gendered phenomenon in peacekeeping and 
its wider impact on international human rights standards. It also questions whether, in the 
interest of promoting human rights standards, impunity granted to soldiers from TCC should 
be revisited given the practical realities of peacekeeping.  
 
1 The Basic UN Legal Framework for Peacekeeper Deployment 
Currently, UN personnel remain immune from host state prosecution for any criminal 
offences committed during a mission.15 Immunity is granted to international bodies to ‘protect 
them against the unilateral interference’ from the host state’s government where they are 
deployed.16 To ensure military contingents on-loan from TCC are held accountable for their 
conduct, they are subject to the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of their respective nation-states.17 The 
1990 Model Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) states in Article 46: all UN peacekeeping 
personnel ‘are immune from legal process in respect to acts that they perform in their official 
capacity.’ Article 47(b) stipulates that if the alleged offender is a member of the military, they 
‘shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating states in respect 
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of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in [the host country or territory].’18 
While these provisions are relatively clear, the laws prevailing peacekeeping operations are 
complex, involving: international and domestic norms interaction; issues of UN immunities 
and privileges; extraterritorial jurisdiction; and interaction between international human rights 
law, humanitarian law and domestic or international criminal liability.19 This complicated legal 
framework has, in practice, had a negative impact on both state responsibility for human 
rights violations and individual accountability for crimes [including sexual exploitation and 
abuse] committed by peacekeepers during missions. Whilst the UN has attempted to sustain 
better discipline of its male-dominated peacekeeping contingents, success in this area 
remains uneven at best, but more often non-existent. This challenges the human rights of 
victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the wider level of human rights available to 
women in post-conflict situations.20  
 
Lack of access to justice and protection for victims is a serious hindrance to the emergence 
of any stable post-conflict society.21 Ensuring that criminal proceedings against perpetrators 
are successfully pursued without danger to victims is a key human rights objective of UN 
peacekeeping. The UN has been criticised for systematically failing to secure gender justice 
in cases involving sexual exploitation and abuse.22 Addressing these charges more 
generally, the 2005 Zeid Report concluded that peacekeeping operations have ‘neither the 
resources nor the mandate to provide comprehensive assistance to victims’.23 Support 
needed by victims requires interference with local culture and communities. This goes 
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beyond the remit for UN peacekeeping missions; they are intended to secure peace and 
security, not to distort local political, legal and cultural structures.24  
 
Securing responsibility for sexual and gender-based violence is a high-profile aspect of 
gender justice in post-conflict territories.25 A major obstacle to achieving this has been that 
many countries fail to either legislatively prohibit sexual and gendered violence, or address 
these crimes with the urgency required. Even in countries where these acts are prohibited, 
authorities are often complicit in perpetrating and/or perpetuating these crimes. 
Consequently, implementation and enforcement of such gender protections are frequently 
absent or are biased towards the perpetrator. In other countries, the victims are held 
culpable and so, legally responsible, for the acts perpetrated against them.26  
 
Attempting to address these issues, UNSCR 1325 was introduced in 2000. It established the 
‘importance of mainstreaming gender perspectives into all aspects of peacebuilding.’27 
Improving access to gender justice was central to the Resolution’s implementation. Later in 
2004, the Secretary-General’s report, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies, agreed that women needed to be ‘included in all initiatives which seek 
redress for past violations’.28 Intervention had to be careful to not ‘revictimize’ marginalised 
and vulnerable groups, which has particularly meant women and girls who have experienced 
sexual violence.29 Despite these developments progress in securing gender-balance and 
gender justice in peacekeeping operations has been inconsistent. A UN Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM) study on UNSCR 1325 pointed out that women are rarely consulted 
about the ‘form, scope and modalities for seeking accountability.’ Women’s involvement in 
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these processes has subsequently ‘been minimized or denied and, in most cases, crimes 
against them go unrecorded’. This amounts to a culture of impunity.30   
 
Part of the issue is that the majority of troops seconded to peacekeeping duties are male. 
Gender experts argue that the hypermasculine and male-dominated cultural and practical 
environment which society and peacekeeping missions operate in has resulted in a 
tolerance being expressed towards sexual exploitation and abuse, and a subsequent 
tradition of silence.31 Elizabeth Defeis argues that in traditionally male-dominated institutions, 
such as law enforcement agencies and the military, bonds are forged which shield members 
from accusations made by those who are outsiders to these institutions. To protect 
peacekeepers and maintain discipline, such charges are often ignored.32 What does this 
suggest about the effectiveness of UN campaigns to advance international human rights, if 
its peacekeeping mission mores are compromised by the cultural masculinities which they 
are dedicated to eradicating? 
 
UN Peacekeeping: Current Reality 
Incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers during deployment 
were initially tolerated in traditional peacekeeping operations; it was not considered by the 
UN as a serious challenge to international human rights standards. Recent changes in the 
management and prosecution of war crimes, including the recognition of rape as a war 
crime, by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), transformed the landscape. This enhanced 
opportunities for uncovering and managing sexual offences committed by peacekeepers 
during operations.33 In 1994, the issue assumed a higher public profile. Media agencies 
reported incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers in the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and by UN forces in Somalia. 
Significantly, these reports charged the UN with failing to both manage these cases and 
maintain the victims’ human rights.34 Responding to these claims, the Special 
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Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, stated, ‘boys will 
be boys’.35 These reports damaged the reputation of the UN; it was viewed as part of the 
problem, rather than the solution.36 Since the late 1990s, the UN, through its Office of the 
Secretary-General and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, made significant efforts to 
remedy the situation. In 1999, the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin made certain areas of 
humanitarian law applicable to UN peacekeeping contingents engaged in peace 
enforcement actions, or in missions where ‘use of force is permitted in self-defense.’37 It 
stated that ‘women should be especially protected against any form of sexual assault’. The 
Bulletin also prohibited ‘rape, enforced prostitution; any form of sexual assault’ and 
enslavement (along with other violations).38 
 
Following release of the Bulletin, the UN prioritised identifying the scale of the problem. In 
2001, reports commissioned by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and Save the Children UK established that aid workers had systematically 
sexually abused ‘refugee communities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.’ While a later 
investigation conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) could not 
confirm specific cases, it did establish that the conditions in the camps exposed refugees to 
risk of such offences.39 In response, the UN General Assembly introduced Resolution 
57/306. The Resolution aimed to investigate incidents involving sexual exploitation and 
abuse of refugees perpetrated by humanitarian aid workers and peacekeeping personnel in 
West Africa.40 The 2003 report which followed established that 24 such incidents had been 
reported to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.41 Later that year, the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse, was introduced. This established the need for special measures and announced a 
zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse.42 Following its introduction, the 
number of cases reported to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations increased 
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dramatically.43 In 2004, after extensive media reports, enquiries were conducted by the 
OIOS and Human Rights Watch, respectively. Both bodies established that sexual 
exploitation and abuse had been committed by peacekeepers against women and children 
during the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). In 
response, in the Secretary-General’s 2004 Annual Report 121 allegations were reported. In 
2005, 340 cases had been reported, and by 2006, 357 allegations had been made. 
Recently, the number of reports of sexual exploitation and abuse has declined.44 In 2014, 51 
such charges were made against UN peacekeepers - ‘the lowest since measures for 
protection’ were introduced.45 
 
The decline in such reports has been credited to a number of factors. In 2005, the Secretary-
General released the Zeid Report, which supposedly provided ‘A comprehensive strategy to 
eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse’ in UN peacekeeping missions.46 The Report 
proposed alterations in the ‘ad hoc’ measures relied on to manage allegations. It also 
suggested solutions ranging from on-site courts martial to financial sanctions and the 
creation of a ‘permanent investigative body.’47 Given the UN statement that reports of sexual 
exploitation and abuse are now being managed more effectively, it clearly considers that it 
has successfully implemented the Zeid Report’s key recommendations. The UN announced 
that: 
 Dedicated conduct and discipline personnel deployed in field missions continue to 
 support each field mission with the implementation of the United Nations three-
 pronged strategy to address sexual exploitation and abuse through prevention, 
 enforcement and remedial actions.48 
 
The question remains, how far these preventative strategies, awareness campaigns, and 
changes to the legal framework have genuinely achieved a significant shift in attitudes and 
practices amongst peacekeepers.49 
 
The UN has claimed that as a result of these measures, both its personnel and host nation 
populations are increasingly aware of UN standards of conduct, and have a firmer 
understanding of protocol. This has meant that complaints received by either body are being 
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dealt with more efficiently and in accordance with UN regulations.50 Consequently, the issue 
of impunity is being addressed, and human rights access has been substantially advanced in 
these cases. 
 
Linked to the decline in reported incidents, this seems to amount to an increasingly 
successful management of the problem by the UN.51 On closer examination, the reality is 
less positive. In March 2015, the UN was accused of ignoring an internal report, which 
described sexual exploitation and abuse as still being the most significant risk in UN 
peacekeeping operations.52 The report suggests that the number of cases reported could be 
far greater, due to issues including underreporting, poor record-keeping53 and the ‘lack of 
confidence’ in the reporting process.54 However, a recent report suggests that there is a 
more serious ongoing problem. In April 2015, leaked confidential documents revealed that 
not only had the UN failed to stop the sexual exploitation and abuse of children in the Central 
African Republic by peacekeepers, but that it had suppressed reports detailing such abuse.55 
This challenges UN assurances that where sexual exploitation and abuse are still occurring 
and it is not intervening, it is because the organisation is unaware of these reports.56 Instead, 
it strongly suggests that the culture of impunity prevails, and that gender-balanced access to 
justice and human rights is not being adequately maintained.  
 
 
2 Impunity 
The UN and Peacekeeping Operations 
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The UN currently has immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts. While this has begun 
to be challenged more generally in those courts, a successful challenge has yet to be 
launched against UN peacekeepers.57 The UN claims that a revision of peacekeeper 
immunity from prosecution in national courts is not required, because it has instituted its own 
mechanisms for dealing with alleged offences.58 These claims are undermined by recent 
reports, which continue to highlight systemic (and systematic) failures with the reporting 
mechanisms and management of these offences. This has resulted in the perception that 
peacekeeping personnel are not accountable for their conduct and that there is ‘a de facto 
tolerance for and immunity from prosecution’ for such behaviour.59 This perception has had 
wider implications for human rights being secured for victims of sexual exploitation and 
abuse; the UN is seen as unwilling, in terms of its internal culture, to address the issues 
contextualising the appropriate management of such charges. 
 
Whilst a number of reports have been commissioned by the UN to identify the extent of the 
problem, little has been done to analyse the problem associated with impunity.60 For 
instance, the UN-commissioned Zeid Report failed to examine whether the criminal actions 
of peacekeepers during deployment should come under the legal authority of the UN, or if 
they should remain under the national jurisdiction of their respective TCC. It also avoided 
any relevant conclusions. The investigative mechanisms employed by the UN to measure 
the number of cases and correlate these findings with the issue of impunity, has also been 
questioned.61 This has resulted in the failure of securing accurate and informative statistics, 
which could quantify the scale of the problem.  
 
In the 2014 Annual Report by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon acknowledged that 
‘much remains to be done to enhance the organization’s response to sexual exploitation and 
abuse.’62 The UN’s commitment to this objective has been challenged. In March 2015, the 
international advocacy organisation, AIDS-Free World, leaked news that the UN had 
suppressed a report that it had commissioned. The report provided substantial evidence of 
incidents of ongoing sexual exploitation and abuse committed by deployed peacekeepers in 
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Africa.63 Paula Donovan, the organisation’s co-director, argues that the findings of the report 
indicate that the UN is still failing to tackle the issue of impunity. The Secretary-General’s 
2014 Report used ‘inadequate and incomplete reporting mechanisms’, which fail to take into 
account the continuing culture of impunity among UN peacekeepers.64 These findings 
challenge the Secretary-General’s assertion that ‘the UN had a zero-tolerance policy 
towards’ sexual exploitation and abuse.65 Rosa Freedman points out that, ‘there are clear 
contradictions between what the experts set out in their research and what Ban Ki-moon 
would like to present as factual’ in his annual report to members.66 Why does this issue 
remain problematic for the UN? 
 
Historical Context of the Culture of Silence and Impunity  
Rape and sexual violence in conflict/post-conflict situations is not a modern phenomenon.67 
However, it was not until rape was established as a war crime by the ICTR and ICTY that 
this dimension to peacekeeping became problematized; it challenged the UN’s ability to 
uphold human rights for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, and undermined the UN’s 
authority for maintaining international human rights standards.68 During World War II, sexual 
violence against civilian women and children was a common occurrence, and featured in the 
subsequent war crimes proceedings of Nuremberg and Tokyo.69 Despite this, both tribunals 
failed to sufficiently address and prosecute these offences. This suggests a long-standing 
historical culture in international criminal law and human rights law, which fails to 
acknowledge acts of sexual violence as serious crimes. This has diminished the status of 
war crimes perpetrated against women and their ability to access justice in the international 
courts. It has also resulted in limited attention being given to victims of sexual violence in 
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armed conflict and post-conflict environments indicating not only that priority is still given to 
male human rights, but that human rights in post-conflict situations remain gendered.70  
 
The lack of attention given to, and silence surrounding crimes involving the sexual 
exploitation and abuse of women, is entrenched in the politics of wartime rape and the way 
rape is used by all parties in armed conflict.71 This helps explain the lack of will to prosecute 
sexual violence in war crimes proceedings.72 In other words, for reasons associated with the 
protection of masculine military cultures on all sides, female human rights are regarded as 
less significant. Evidence suggests that a culture of silence continues to be reflected in the 
UN management of sexual exploitation and abused committed by peacekeepers.73 This is 
partly because military make-up is typically predominantly male.74 There is also concern over 
the extent to which a masculine culture within the UN itself continues to affect its will to deal 
with this problem transparently.  
 
3 Combating Impunity in Peacekeeping Operations: A Gender-Balanced 
 Approach  
Post-1945, efforts have been made by the UN through various initiatives and resolutions to 
counter gender inequality, and sexual and gender-based violence. International human 
rights treaties have been introduced which have prohibited rape, human trafficking and 
commercial prostitution.75 Where rape has not been explicitly addressed, it is recognised as 
a violation of other human rights’ instruments, including the ‘prohibition of torture and other 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment’.76 Moreover, CEDAW states that all state parties 
must ‘suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women’.77 As 
pointed out by the sponsoring Committee, sexual exploitation and abuse is also prohibited 
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under acts which ‘inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, 
coercion and other deprivations of liberty.’78 Regarding peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the 
UN has extended initiatives by introducing a number of policies and legislation to achieve 
gender equality, and gender mainstreaming in Security Council mandates for peace support 
operations.79 The establishment of UNSCR 1325 explicitly recognised the role of women in 
the maintenance of peace and security.80 Notably, it called for ‘an end to impunity and the 
prosecution of those responsible for crimes related to sexual and other violence against 
women and girls.’81 In 2008, UNSCR 1820 was introduced, which focused on sexual 
violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations.82 In contrast, UNSCR 1888 and 
UNSCR 1889 (passed 2009) envisaged ‘a wider range of roles for women in conflict than as 
victims’.83 These Resolutions also instituted monitoring and accountability mechanisms, 
including the appointment of the Special Representative on sexual violence in armed 
conflict. UNSCR 1888, more specifically, required the Secretary-General to continue to 
‘strengthen efforts to implement the zero tolerance policy in UN peacekeeping operations.’84 
 
It is now agreed at the highest international levels that the sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by peacekeeping personnel during deployment amounts to human rights 
violations.85 This is the theory. Practically, disciplining alleged perpetrators has remained 
problematic. UNSCR 1325 is not a binding decision and there are no monitoring 
mechanisms in place to ensure that it is complied with.86 Arguably, had its spirit and letter 
been fulfilled, the additional Resolutions would not have been considered necessary by the 
UN.87 At the 2014 End Sexual Violence in Conflict Global Summit, a mock criminal trial of 
UNSCR 1325 was held. Anne-Marie Goetz concluded that though it was to be seen as a 
failure, it was not necessarily because of the terms outlined in the resolution; it is the UN’s 
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lack of will to realise the standards they advocated.88 What has the UN done to address such 
criticism?  
 
 
UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Impunity 
The UN has introduced legal changes and regulatory mechanisms which claim to address 
problems associated with ‘hypermasculine’ culture. It has also implemented a ‘zero tolerance 
policy’ to aid it in combating impunity in peacekeeping operations. Arguably, these 
instruments provide a paradigm of how to use legislation and non-legal regulatory 
mechanisms together to enhance their overall effectiveness.89 How does this work in 
practice? The UN requires TCC to ensure at national, regional or sub-regional levels that 
their military contingents receive ‘pre-deployment training on UN standards of conduct, in 
addition to mission-specific rules and regulations, and local laws.’ Such countries must also 
arrange for contingent commanders to receive training to maintain troop discipline.90  
 
In 2005, Troop Conduct and Discipline Units and the Troop Conduct and Discipline Teams 
were introduced. The structure is intended to act as a ‘repository for misconduct allegations.’ 
Currently, Conduct and Discipline Teams are the first point of contact for reporting 
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed during peacekeeping missions. 
Whilst they are not responsible for conducting investigations, these teams examine 
allegations and determine whether a formal legal investigation is required. They report 
disciplinary problems and ensure UN Standards of Conduct are correctly interpreted and 
applied. They also provide advice to the Mission Head on issues such as: complaints and 
data management; raising local awareness of complaints mechanisms; and provide 
feedback to victims on the outcome on investigations.91 The Conduct and Discipline Teams 
focus on improving training of UN peacekeepers in relation to contextualising issues such as 
gender-balance and human rights, local cultures and UN standards of conduct.92 These 
educational prevention strategies largely rely on ‘traditional information-based awareness’ 
platforms such as training seminars and manuals in order to communicate educational 
information to ‘a passive target audience’.93 They also operate beyond troop training 
providing awareness campaigns in mission zone territories. Target demographics for these 
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include ‘host populations, local government officials, civil society organisations, international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations.’94 
 
These programmes have been strongly criticised. Some have argued that the ‘information-
based educational programmes [do] not bring about consistent’ behaviour change. Even 
individuals with high levels of prior information and knowledge can participate in high-risk 
activities and offending behaviours, as the experience of UN peacekeeping operations 
underline. Psychologists argue that simply ‘Asking people to change their behaviour’ has 
little impact. It overlooks ‘the broader social context of masculine and feminine identities, 
which makes the negotiation of behaviour change a complex process.’ From this 
perspective, in order to achieve transformative change, other factors which influence and 
determine behaviours must be focused on, and ‘more innovative attempts to bring about 
behaviour change’ need to be developed.95 
 
Others argue that there are more practical considerations which complicate the matter of 
training. Given the huge range of topics addressed in induction training, ‘gender training may 
not be well retained or understood by’ peacekeepers.96 Lesley Abdela suggests that prior to 
deployment gender training assessments should be performed on peacekeepers to identify 
gaps in knowledge and understanding.97 These assessments could also support the UN 
standards of conduct in this area.98 From a human rights perspective, Todd Howland, 
director of the MONUC human rights division, states: 
 There should be analysis of the root causes of the conflict and of which human rights 
 are implicated. A baseline study of the level of respect for human rights should be 
 done at the beginning of the operation. Programmes should be put in place to 
 measurably increase the level of respect for the target rights (those linked to the root 
 cause of the conflict).99 
 
Extending this further, Gabrielle Simm argues that the relationship between UN policy on 
gender mainstreaming and UN policy on sex in peace operations, needs to be investigated. 
However, gender experts are divided. There are those who link the charges against 
peacekeepers to sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and gender inequality more 
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generally within cultures. Others do not value gender training and believe that combating 
such behaviour towards women and girls is a discipline and conduct matter for troops. Like 
Abdela, Ray Murphy connects sexual exploitation and abuse to the ‘overall failure of gender 
mainstreaming in peace operations and a failure acknowledge the rights and interests of 
women in post-conflict situations in general’. Sarah Martin, on the other hand, asserts that it 
is ‘not strictly a gender issue’; rather it is a ‘disciplinary offence [or crime] akin to stealing or 
assault’. Whilst related, more attention has been given to sex than gender in 
peacekeeping.100 If the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse is to be dealt with effectively, 
gender must be central to any conversation regarding sex in peacekeeping operations.101 
This returns the focus to the UN as an institution and to the leadership displayed by its 
senior officials. 
 
4 The General-Secretary’s Bulletin: Zero Tolerance Policy 
As part of the response to charges of inaction over impunity, the 2003 Secretary-General’s 
Bulletin provided definitions of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, to clarify what 
constitutes these offences.102 The Bulletin defined sexual abuse as ‘any actual or threatened 
physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive 
conditions.’ Sexual exploitation is defined as ‘any actual or attempted abuse of a position of 
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, 
profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.’ A range of 
conduct is addressed under these definitions, including rape, sex with minors, trafficking, 
child pornography, the solicitation of prostitutes, and even cases bordering on ‘ordinary 
sexual relationships’.103 The Bulletin also stated that UN forces have a duty of care towards 
women and children. Sexual intercourse with any individual under 18 years old is 
prohibited.104 Additionally, sexual relations between peacekeepers and ‘beneficiaries of 
assistance’ were ‘strongly discouraged’.105 This seems, on initial examination, a genuine 
attempt to remedy the issue of impunity and protect the human rights of women in post-
conflict regions. 
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The Bulletin has not been universally well-received. Simm argues that, ironically, the 
continuing problem is located in the gender essentialist standard captured in the UN’s zero 
tolerance policy. This sees the masculinity of soldiers as ‘leading inexorably’ to the sexual 
exploitation and abuse of women.106 The Bulletin ‘relies on and perpetuates negative gender 
stereotypes and imperial hierarchies’, which are (potentially) equally deleterious to both men 
and women. Its core perspective, therefore, reinforces discrimination and stigma. It not only 
positions women and girls as powerless victims with unequal status to men, but also 
positions the male peacekeepers as sexual predators. This reinforces the traditional view 
that male violence is intrinsic to ‘normal’ masculinity.107 This relates to the ongoing tension 
between typical soldiering duties: where violence is associated with the success of a ‘normal’ 
military mission and peacekeeping or with the failure of the core objectives of the exercise.108 
As Whitworth has commented, ‘All the messages a soldier receives about appropriately 
soldierly masculine behaviour are fundamentally at odds with what is expected in a 
peacekeeping operation’.109 Instead of exploring this issue in a way that engages with this 
tension and associated gender stereotypes, the Bulletin has effectively confirmed the 
traditional stereotypes of militarised masculinity.110 As a result, there is something 
paradoxical in the way the UN seeks on the one hand to address the culture of impunity in 
this area, while on the other, maintaining a zero tolerance policy. In practice, the UN’s 
rhetoric confirms that an ‘innate male predisposition’ to sexual violence exists. This makes it 
difficult for the UN to acknowledge the possibility that sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by deployed peacekeepers might be socially constructed: being political and 
enabled by institutional, economic, cultural and legal conditions.111 It also makes it difficult 
for soldiers employed in peacekeeping missions to address their own behaviour, and those 
of the men they lead, in ways that can help break down entrenched cultural attitudes 
associated with masculinity in the military context.112  
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It is, therefore, the definitions of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and the underlying 
assumptions about ‘typical’ masculine behaviour provided in the Bulletin, which are most 
problematic. This is both in terms of the explicit comments and the implicit associations with 
peacekeeping and masculinity. For example, the Bulletin failed to define what is meant by 
‘beneficiaries of assistance’.113 Equally, not all conduct prohibited under these definitions 
constitutes a violation under international or national law.114 This not only makes 
implementing the rules problematic, but also makes it difficult to address the underpinning 
masculine cultures associated with impunity. Burke highlights that there are also a number of 
issues with the overly sweeping definition of sexual exploitation. Its all-inclusive remit allows 
little room for distinguishing between ordinary fraternizing with locals, which might include 
the commercial transaction of soliciting prostitutes, and other sexual offences, including 
rape, forced prostitution and sex with minors. A failure to differentiate between commercial 
prostitution and acts such as rape can potentially trivialise the latter type of offending, 
particularly in the eyes of deployed peacekeepers.115 
 
Inevitably, there are complex issues regarding sexual relationships between peacekeepers 
and the so-called beneficiaries of assistance. The term sexual relationships has been 
employed by the UN to address a range of sexual practices between peacekeepers and 
locals: ‘from temporary and transactional to open-ended or permanent’. While the zero 
tolerance policy addressed a broad spectrum of sexual practices, and applied the same 
‘blunt tool of prohibition’ to all of them, this method was not extended to sexual 
relationships.116 Under the Bulletin, the official UN position is that sexual relationships are 
‘strongly discouraged’. Discretion is provided to senior UN authorities to determine whether 
relationships are exploitative.117 Responding to earlier criticism levied at the UN for denying 
local women and peacekeepers a degree of sexual agency in managing relations, it 
determined that these groups should be entrusted with the responsibility to distinguish 
between ‘sexually exploitative and non-exploitative sex’ in peacekeeping operations. 
Theoretically, the rule was supposed to help eradicate stereotypes of local women as 
inherently vulnerable and peacekeepers as predators.118 Practically, the ‘ambiguities’ in the 
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rule are ‘not easily amenable’.119 Firstly, to strongly discourage sexual relationships 
‘regardless of consent, age and fair remuneration’, equally undermines women’s agency and 
sexual autonomy. Secondly, it distorts the distinction between sexual offences and 
consensual sexual intercourse from the perspective of the predominantly masculine 
peacekeeping contingents.120 Even if we accept the UN’s provision on sexual relationships, 
the term ‘strongly discouraged’ is highly problematic because it permits the use of individual 
judgement. This makes UN officials responsible for determining what constitutes a legitimate 
relationship.121 This is very challenging, as it is often difficult to differentiate between 
‘transactions sex and a marriage-like relationship entered for the durations of a 
peacekeeper’s posting whereby a “girlfriend” is supported in exchange for housework and 
sex.’122  
 
Olivera Simic argues that overall, the Bulletin ‘unjustly’ treats all women as victims and all 
peacekeepers as sexual predators as a consequence of the UN’s consistent failure to 
engage with gender as a core concern in addressing its daily business.123 To achieve the 
practical promotion of equal human rights (for female victims in particular), the UN needs to 
acknowledge the practical realities of where peacekeeping missions are deployed, and how 
and why prostitution is used in these settings. Peacekeeping environments are 
‘characterized by collapsed economies, weak judicial systems, corrupt and ineffective law 
enforcement agencies, weak or non-existent rule of law, and significant power differentials 
between peacekeepers and the local populations.’124 In such permissive environments, the 
potential for sexual violence against civilians is rooted in the collapse of law and order, 
socioeconomic infrastructure and socio-cultural norms found in post-conflict territories.125 It is 
(as much as the pre-formed attitudes of deployed troops) this aspect of post-conflict reality 
which exposes local populations to risk from peacekeepers. Dianne Otto argues that in 
ignoring the significance of entrenched gender inequalities, including the reality of survival 
sex, the UN’s current approach is flawed. Not only does it deny women’s sexual agency, it 
also ‘thwarts the larger project of realizing women’s human rights.’126 Further, it perpetuates 
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expectations of masculine conduct in relation to women that are negative, and potentially 
damaging to more sensitive and nuanced masculinities. 
 
The way sexual interchanges are used as currency and negotiation tools in post-conflict 
scenarios needs to be examined, to shift cultural attitudes which portray women as victims, 
and not as agents and survivors. The records illustrate that when on deployment, 
peacekeepers often pay for sex, and frequently use brothels and exchange sex with locals in 
return for food or other commodities, including protection. To date, research fails to explore 
the extent to which this also involves force and exploitation with a sexual dimension. 
Academics who have touched on aspects of this topic have largely investigated why women 
prostitute their bodies; not why peacekeepers pay for sex and the implications that this 
would have for understanding the nuances of militarised masculinities. The limited amount of 
raw data produced means that the policies which have been introduced to prevent such 
exploitation, and eliminate the culture of impunity, have failed to capture the extent and 
underlying cause of the problem.127 Otto argues that the UN’s zero tolerance policy, which 
bans the exchange of money for sex or other tradable goods, is a blunt instrument; it 
penalises rather than promotes women’s human rights. The UN’s failure to recognise the 
root causes of poverty and gender inequality in post-conflict regions undercuts the survival 
strategies and decision-making resources of the individuals involved. The argument is that 
the zero tolerance has served to cement the low social status of women and girls by 
penalising women’s agency.128 Arguably, this also serves to diminish the seriousness of 
cases where force has been employed by peacekeepers. This has a negative effect on 
gender-balanced human rights and has undermined the potential for construction of 
genuinely stable post-conflict states. 
 
5 Moving Forward 
The UN formally acknowledges the importance of involving women actively in post-conflict 
reconstruction.129 It also relies heavily on peacekeeping forces to maintain peace and protect 
post-conflict populations. Part of peacebuilding involves promoting equal access to justice 
and gender-blind protection to victims of war crimes. Evidence has led gender experts to 
claim that the UN is failing in this area. It has been criticised for falling short on its 
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commitment to: protect and promote women’s human rights; introduce and enforce robust 
(non-)legal mechanisms to prevent peacekeepers from committing gender-based sexual 
violence in post-conflict environments; ensure that cases of sexual exploitation and abuse 
committed by deployed peacekeepers are managed effectively; and that justice is secured 
for victims. Can the UN resolve these short-falls? 
 
Permitting the prosecution of soldiers within civilian courts in TCC could be a viable solution. 
Where state extraterritorial jurisdiction is introduced, such countries are obliged to observe a 
minimum standard of due diligence for offences committed by their deployed military 
contingents. Legally states can be held responsible for their actions, the acts of their agents, 
and for omissions where they fail to comply with and meet standards under human rights 
treaties. States are obliged to do what is reasonable to preserve and protect the rights of 
victims.130 Due diligence is understood as being bound by a ‘standard of “reasonableness”’. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights states that a nation is responsible for taking 
‘reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations committed within its jurisdiction, to 
identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim 
adequate compensation.’131 But the regular omission by TCC to investigate and prosecute 
incidents involving their deployed soldiers suggests that, despite the legal obligation, such 
conduct remains tolerated in practice. Caroline Allais points out that countries have often 
either been too embarrassed by reports of misconduct by their soldiers during peacekeeping 
operations,132 or have not considered the offences ‘sufficiently grave’ to prosecute.133  
 
Not all agree that this is the reason for failure to tackle the issue. Richard Wilson and Emily 
Singer suggest that often many states actually do not have the necessary legal infrastructure 
for extraterritorial application of their criminal laws. This is especially the case where the 
formal justice mechanisms of such states also remain powerfully and traditionally 
masculine.134 Even on occasions when TCC have attempted to take disciplinary action 
against alleged offenders, they frequently find that investigations against alleged 
perpetrators are insufficient or that evidence has not been collected in a manner which is 
compliant with national law.135  
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A further complication is the ‘underprosecution of crimes against women’ within a nation-
state’s own criminal justice system. Feminists argue that this has a profound impact on the 
prosecution of peacekeepers for crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse within the civilian 
court system: ‘Ignorance of gender issues results in inadequate attention to crimes against 
women by national authorities.’ Czech authorities rejected a charge relating to the alleged 
rape of a fellow US peacekeeper by two Czech peacekeepers. The court held that because 
the complainant had previously had consensual sex with one of the two accused, she must 
be held to have consented to the whole incident. This suggests that the Czech criminal court 
culture promotes a conception that where an individual has previously consented to sex with 
an individual, she is likely to always consent to sex where the same individual is involved. It 
also suggests that the men involved have no need to challenge their assumptions of 
consent.136 The human rights of individual peacekeeping troops have regularly taken priority 
over any charge of violation of human rights brought by victims. This in turn promotes the 
value of predominantly masculine human rights over those of women and girls undermining 
the likelihood that the solution can be found in the national civilian courts. This then returns 
the problem to the UN’s jurisdiction and responsibility.  
 
Whilst the current system of criminal jurisdiction on UN peacekeeping has become 
increasingly ‘systemised’, missions of bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) involve more ad hoc arrangement[s].137 In both UN and NATO peacekeeping 
operations, the rights of TCC over their soldiers are often secured and protected. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Dayton agreements stated that NATO armed forces would be under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of their nations-states.138 SOFA’s are used by NATO to regulate troops 
stationed in other member states. They establish and assign (amongst others) jurisdiction to 
either the contributing or the host nation, depending on whether the acts are punishable by 
one state or the other. For example, if the offence is punishable under the law of the troop 
contributing, but not under the host nation’s law, then the former exercises exclusive 
authority over the case, and vice versa. Both assume ‘concurrent authority’ in cases where 
the conduct is punishable by the laws of both states. In those cases, the contributing country 
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has primary right to prosecute military contingents who commit offences, including those 
involving sexual exploitation and abuse.139 The over-arching NATO SOFA provides that: 
If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify 
 the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the 
State   having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from 
the  authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other 
State  for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver 
to be of  particular importance.140  
 
Often SOFAs between the US and numerous other countries have also provided for some 
type of primary and secondary jurisdiction for offences committed by deployed US military 
personnel.141  
 
Bedont suggests that the NATO model (which emulates the Rome Statute complementarity 
principle) could provide a potential solution for the UN in tackling both the issue of impunity, 
and the under-prosecution of crimes committed by deployed peacekeepers.142 Under the 
model, primary jurisdiction could be granted to the TCC to prosecute its soldiers by the 
SOFA and contribution agreement. Where the offence committed is a crime in both 
territories, it could grant the host nation ‘operation of exercising jurisdiction where the 
contributing states waives its primary jurisdiction’. There are also possibilities for granting 
secondary jurisdiction to other bodies such as the ICC or an ad hoc tribunal, with 
amendments to the terms.143 In the event that an act is punishable only under the host 
nation’s law, jurisdiction could be granted to them.144 This would be particularly beneficial in 
cases of gender-based sexual violence, and protecting the human rights of women. Some 
UN TCC do not prohibit all types of gender-based or sexual violence. For instance, in some 
states, men who murder female relatives who are held to ‘dishonour’ their families are 
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protected from criminal prosecution under the country’s penal code. Other countries do not 
prosecute rape and other forms of sexual violence if the perpetrator is married to/marries the 
victim.145 This is particularly problematic in UN peacekeeping operations, as peacekeepers 
often marry their victims.146 Others ‘have onerous evidentiary rules’. This makes it difficult to 
secure convictions for sexual violence and reinforces the culture of impunity towards these 
crimes.147 
 
The NATO model also provides provisions to ensure that both TCC and host nations 
cooperate, and provide updates on developments/progress made in cases. Additionally, the 
former’s military authorities can exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over individuals 
‘subject to its military law’ within the receiving state; enabling them to proceed locally with 
investigations/trials in the state where the offence took place. This would limit the risk of 
encountering problems associated with victims and local populations being uninformed 
about the fate of perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse.148  
 
This model would preserve a degree of control by TCC over their soldiers. It would also 
compel these countries to take action against troops who commit criminal offences during 
deployment, and report its progress to both the host nation and the UN. Though it is rare that 
states surrender their jurisdiction, there have been occasions where ‘states have not insisted 
on their strict legal rights when faced with great public pressure’ and scrutiny. For instance, 
in 1995, in Okinawa, locals were publically angered that a US soldier had allegedly raped a 
Japanese girl. Protests followed which called for a US military base to withdraw from Japan. 
Attempting to maintain relations and appease the locals, the US waived its rights and 
permitted the Japanese authorities to arrest the soldier before he was formally indicted. It is 
important to note that this is not a general procedure. Nevertheless, ‘an alternative model 
exists’, and it is one that could be acceptable to the various states involved. This could then 
serve to assuage the problem of impunity for crimes committed by peacekeepers.149 
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The NATO model arguably provides a plausible solution for improving the management and 
prosecution of crimes committed by deployed peacekeepers, and the issue of state 
accountability. Equally, in contrast to the UN system, the agreements outlined offer greater 
equality between TCC and host nations, and their respective jurisdictional arrangements.150 
However, there are fundamental challenges which the model fails to address. In being part 
of individual national legal processes, military courts of national authorities are often 
responsible for prosecuting peacekeepers for crimes involving sexual exploitation and 
abuse. Not only were military court systems set up to deal with military crimes, which 
predominantly relate to misconduct and maintenance of discipline within the military; they 
also presumed the masculinity of the justice process within such courts. They consequently 
lack the basic structures and safeguards to secure gender-blind justice for victims (especially 
in cases with a sexual dimension), and fail to ensure their human rights.151  
 
The military in any nation-state remains predominantly male-dominated, despite growing 
numbers of females in the armed services of many Western countries. In safeguarding 
internal military cultures and standards of discipline, a military force is likely to prioritise and 
interpret breaches of conduct according to its internal rules. It is therefore ‘unsuitable’ for use 
in prosecuting cases committed against women by peacekeepers which involve sexual 
violence. Especially given the poor record that most military forces have with similar 
prosecutions involving female members of their own ranks.152 Feminists argue that the 
ongoing problem is rooted in the militarized masculinity and ‘glorification’ of masculine 
aggression; aggressive attitudes considered instrumental in conflict are condoned in 
militaries and privileged over so-called feminine qualities.153 This is clearly illustrated in the 
pattern of the prosecutions of peacekeepers for such crimes. For example, in 1997, the 
Italian armed forces failed to take action against Italian peacekeepers charged with ‘violation 
[rape], torture and maltreatment against civilians’, because such offences were not ‘provided 
for by the Military Penal Code’ in such circumstances. The troops were subsequently 
disciplined but not prosecuted. Allocating responsibility for prosecution of crimes against 
women to individuals who operate in this culture is problematic, because of the inherent 
contradictions in priorities and agendas.  
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The complex nature of UN peacekeeping operations and management of deployed 
peacekeepers pose significant challenges in both prosecuting cases and protecting the 
human rights of the victims. These challenges cannot be met successfully by any ‘single 
state or organisation: it requires a multi-dimensional approach.154 Employing the NATO 
model is one potentially viable solution. It could provide a clear ‘division of labour’ between 
the UN, troop contributing and host nations. From the evidence examined, the UN is not 
equipped to fully address the political, social and military aspects of peacekeeping, which 
continue to promote impunity towards these crimes. The UN must do better in promoting co-
operation with the international community, including non-government organisations such as 
AIDS-Free World, to effectively address and eradicate the culture of impunity in 
peacekeeping operations. This will also help the UN to achieve its wider aim of establishing 
and securing international human rights standards.155 As suggested by Abdela and Murphy, 
this will include informed, robust pre-deployment gender training programmes, which go 
beyond the scope of current programmes. Providing initiatives to increase the number of 
female troops deployed in peacekeeping will also help to counter the institutionalised 
hypermasculine culture present in the military. 
 
Conclusion 
It is easy to lay blame, and many of the commentators on the issue of the consequences of 
the culture of impunity do so. But where should the balance of blame lie? What this article 
has shown is that this is a very complex issue and that an absence of consciously-gendered, 
assertive action derives from both the TCC and the UN. Only slow progress towards gender-
balanced preventative and punitive measures has been made by most of the TCCs. 
Certainly action has included the introduction of a gesture at least towards gender-sensitive 
training programmes for peacekeepers which are intended to make peacekeepers aware of 
their own masculine assumptions. The programmes are essential for informing them about 
appropriate attitudes and behaviour towards women, and the seriousness which these 
programmes are taken during deployment, but the trainers need to take them seriously and 
to ensure that the leaders of troops about to be deployed are fully on board with the new 
ideas, or they are unlikely to be either able or willing to enforce these new perspectives on 
the men (and occasionally women) under their command. TCCs have certainly been too 
slow in enforcing the necessary ‘uniform designed rules’, arguing that this is because of 
cultural difference in the acceptance of certain behaviours. This, in turn, has reinforced the 
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culture of impunity.156 But this is not surprising and the key responsibility lies not with the 
TCCs but rather, with the UN itself.  
 
The reality is that despite the introduction of a zero-tolerance policy for sexual misconduct 
for peacekeepers, the UN continues to struggle even to recognise and confront the issue of 
impunity at all levels of its operations. It is as part of this that it encounters great difficulty in 
getting contributing countries to investigate and prosecute their offending peacekeepers 
thereafter.157 This seriously affects women’s access to human rights in post-conflict 
societies, and has negative connotations for the authority of the UN as an arbiter of human 
rights standards in situations where violations of these are being charged. To be fair, 
recently the UN has placed a real emphasis on introducing preventive measures to eliminate 
sexual exploitation and abuse being committed by deployed peacekeepers, as this article 
has also shown.158 The Secretary-General has introduced a code of conduct, which is written 
into contracts of UN peacekeeper personnel and the UN has also insisted that it is focused 
on ensuring that perpetrators are punished and prosecuted.159 Nevertheless, the recent 
developments highlighted here suggest much more needs to be done if sexual exploitation 
and abuse as a regular corollary to peacekeeping operations is to be eliminated. 
 
Upholding ‘peace and security’ and ‘respecting human rights’ constitute the ‘two main 
purposes’ of the UN.160 In failing to address the issue of impunity as a challenge to the 
human rights of civilian populations (especially the women within those populations), it is 
failing to address the real core of the problem, and undermining the organisation’s 
fundamental purpose. It has to be acknowledged that there is significant opposition from 
member states, but even more significant is the ongoing inertia from UN personnel at all 
levels of the institution when it comes to modifying the existing system. This inherent inbuilt 
inertia means that it is likely that reform will only occur if there is a push externally for 
change, which is genuinely and intrinsically gender sensitive. Hence the urgent need to 
analyse recent developments made in international law and justice, and their wider 
implications.161 In that sense, it is essential to maintain and even enhance the current level 
of critical attacks on the UN and its lack of will to go beyond rhetoric and enforce its own 
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policies and regulations. The hopeful sign is that more widely there are figures, such as 
Lieutenant General David Morrison, coming forward to take a lead in changing wider military 
and social cultures.162 More figures like this need to be encouraged and their work given a 
high profile by the critical commentators on the UN’s actions. It is only through such 
initiatives and the dissemination of information about them that change is likely to be 
implemented. The most dangerous threat to human rights is complacency; the feeling that 
policies are in place and so enough is being done. It is not. 
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